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Abstract. A simple “Bread and Peace” model shows that aggregate votes for President in
postwar elections were determined entirely by weighted-average growth of real disposable
personal income per capita during the incumbent party’s term and the cumulative numbers
of American military personnel killed in action as a result of U.S. intervention in the Korean
and Vietnamese civil wars. The model is subjected to robustness tests against twenty-two
variations in functional form inspired by the extensive literature on presidential voting. Not
one of these variations adds value to the Bread and Peace model or signiﬁcantly perturbs its
coefﬁcients.
1. The Bread and Peace model
Postwar American presidential elections should for the most part be viewed
as a sequence of referendums on the White House party’s economic record. In
fact, aside from the 1952 and 1968 contests when U.S. military involvement
in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars, respectively, most likely deprived
the Democrats of victory, growth of real disposable personal income per cap-
ita during the presidential term accounts, all by itself, for over 90% of the
variation in aggregate voting outcomes. The remarkably robust association is
illustrated by Figure 1 which graphs percentage shares of the two-party vote
going to candidates of the incumbent party in relation to weighted-average
growth of real disposable personal income per capita, computed from the
election quarter back to the ﬁrst full quarter of each presidential term.
Growth of real disposable personal income per capita is probably the
broadest single aggregate measure of changes in voters’ economic well-
being, in as much as it includes income from all market sources, is adjusted
for inﬂation, taxes, government transfer payments and population growth,
and tends to move with changes in unemployment.1 For these reasons it
is not surprising that it is a good single-variable election predictor. What
perhaps is surprising, however, is that no other variable appearing in the
extensive literature on economic voting adds anything statistically to the ex-
planation of aggregate presidential election outcomes when conditioned on
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Figure 1. Real income growth and the two-party vote share of the incumbent party’s
presidential candidate.
weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal income and
cumulative numbers of American military personnel killed-in-action in Korea
and Vietnam.2 Much of this paper is devoted to establishing this assertion.
The Bread and Peace equation generating the data depicted in the Figure
is,3
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where
– Vote is the incumbent party’s percentage share of the aggregate two-
party presidential vote,
– R is per capita disposable personal income (seasonally adjusted at an-
nual rates) deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index, and 1ln Rt is the
annualized quarter on quarter percentage rate of growth, 1ln Rt D
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is just a normalizing constant, so that 1 registers the
response of Vote to movements in the weighted-average of real income
growth rates,
– CUM KIA is the cumulative number of American military personnel
killed-in-action (in 1000s) in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars dur-
ing the presidential terms preceding the elections of 1952, 1964, 1968
and 1976, and
– 0 D 46:1; 1 D 4:12;D 0:954; 2 D− 0:369:
Nonlinear least-squares estimation of the equation over 1952 to 1996
(twelve presidential elections)5 yields the results shown in row 1 of Table 1
(the“benchmark” regression). Theparameter estimate for 1lnRinthe bench-
mark model implies that each percentage point of per capita real disposable
personal income growth sustained over the term of ofﬁce yields a 4 percent-
age point deviation of the incumbent party’s vote share from a constant of
46%. Hence, absent Americans being killed-in-action in wars like Korea and
Vietnam (CUM KIA), the incumbent party becomes increasingly more likely
to win the presidential election as weighted-average real income growth per-
formance exceeds a break-even rate of 1.0% – which is only a little more than
half the 1949 to 1996 mean growth rate of 1.9%. At real income growth rates
equal to the mean, the model predicts an incumbent Vote share of about 54%,
whichis morethan 2standard errors above the break-even 50% markand so is
well within the range of highly likely victory. The equation therefore implies
a bias favoring the incumbent party. As voters have more recent information
about the party in power than about the opposition, this implication may be
rationalized by risk aversion.6 (See Quattrone and Tversky, 1988.)
Unlike the set-up of economic voting models that assume only the election
year (or half year) economic record matters,7 a weighting parameter estimate
as high as 0.95 means that election outcomes are inﬂuenced by real income
growth over the whole term. In fact, the hypothesis  D 1 cannot be rejected
at conventional test levels (the p-value is 0.23). The hypothesis of ﬂat or uni-
form weighting under which voting responds to a simple arithmetic average152
Table 1. Bread and Peace model regressions: Benchmark estimates and time-wise stability
(presidential elections 1952–1996).
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1. Benchmark 46.1 4.1 0.95 –0.37 .90 1.97
model, Eq. 1 (42.2/.00) (7.4/.00) (26.9/.00) (–5.5/.00)
(1952–1996)
2. Omitting the 46.3 2.86 0.82 .54 6.24
CUM KIA term (20.8/.000) (2.9/0.01) (6.0/.00)
Signif. level for equivalence of O 0; O 1;
O 2; O  to benchmark estimates in row 1:
3. Non-war 46.2 4.1 0.95 NA .999
elections (omitting (40.0/.00) (6.8/.00) (24.7/.00)
1952, 68)
4. First 8 elections 46.7 4.3 0.94 –0.36 .953
(1952–1980) (47.8/.00) (9.3/.00) (31.2/.00) (–7.4/.00)
5. Last 7 elections 45.9 4.4 0.96 NA .991
(1972–1996) (27.7/.00) (4.5/.01) (20.8/.00)
Notes. In parentheses (t-ratio/signiﬁcance level); Election quarter growth rates are computed
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earlier.
of over-the-term real income growth rates is therefore not implausible. Evid-
ently there is little scope for Nordhaus-style political business cycles from
the aggregate vote-side of the macro political economy (Nordhaus, 1975).
A fairly uniform weighting of income growth rates gives incumbents little
incentive to back load whatever inﬂuence they might exert on real income
growth. Voting outcomes under the Bread and Peace model therefore reveal
rather little voter myopia by the standards of the literature. A weighting
parameter close to 1.0 (a backward-looking discount rate close to 0.0) also
has implications for the rationality of backward-looking or pure retrospective
voting. I pursue this issue in the next section.
TheCUMKIAcoefﬁcient registers the incumbent party vote losses caused
by the two most important non-economic events affecting presidential elec-
tions: the American interventions in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars.
Congress never legitimated American engagement in either conﬂict with153
a formal declaration of war. And both wars ultimately became extremely
unpopular, prompting sitting Democratic Presidents, who otherwise had ex-
cellent re-election prospects because they presided over favorable economic
conditions (Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson), to decide against seeking
another term.
Previous studies of domestic aspects of theAmerican military involvement
in Korea and Vietnam8 deliver two conclusions that guided my investigation
of war effects on presidential voting outcomes: (i) Declining political sup-
port for the wars per se, as well as war-induced deterioration of presidential
approval ratings in the polls, are best explained by cumulative growth of
American casualties, particularly cumulative numbers of American military
personnel killed-in-action, and (ii) The political costs were born primarily
by the party initiating American participation (the “war party”; in both cases
the Democrats). The results I obtained are consistent with these conclusions.
The vote losses associated with Korea and Vietnam are best tracked by the
cumulative numbers of American military personnel killed-in-action (CUM
KIA) during each four-year term preceding the elections of 1952, 1964, 1968
and 1976. (See Appendix 1, Calibration of the election effects of American
military participation in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars.)
The coefﬁcient for CUM KIA shows that Korea and Vietnam were huge
liabilities for the incumbent Democrats. Cumulative numbers of Americans
killed-in-action (in 1000s) at the 1952 and 1968 election dates were 29.3 and
28.9, respectively, which given a parameter estimate of –0.37 implies that
the vote shares for Adlai Stevenson and Hubert Humphrey were depressed
by nearly eleven percentage points apiece.9 Estimated effects of Korea and
Vietnam are illustrated in Figure 1 by the vertical arrows running from the
vote shares expected from economic performance alone to the actual 1952
and 1968 outcomes. The estimates indicate that had Stevenson not been
burdened by the toll of American killed-in-action following Harry Truman’s
decision to commit American troops to the defense of South Korea, he prob-
ably would have defeated Dwight Eisenhower handily in 1952. And real
disposable income growth rate performance was so favorable during 1965–
68 that Humphrey almost surely would have trounced Richard Nixon had he
not been saddled by the decisions of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to
commit American troops to the defense of South Vietnam.10 Indeed had there
been no American involvement in the Vietnamese civil war, Johnson rather
than Humphrey no doubt would have been the Democratic party’s candidate
in 1968. These historical precedents help explain why the Clinton Admin-
istration was so reluctant to put the lives of American military personnel at
signiﬁcant risk during NATO’s intervention in the Serbia-Kosovo conﬂict.154
The second row in Table 1 reports a regression experiment that omits
the CUM KIA variable. This speciﬁcation is essentially the same as that
used in Hibbs (1982) where I discovered the statistical power of applying
geometric lag weighting to disposable income growth rates in order to ﬁt
presidential election outcomes from 1952 to 1980.11 My 1982 paper repor-
ted a weighted-average real disposable income effect on presidential vote
shares of about 3 and a lag-weight parameter estimate of 0.8; similar to
the estimates in Table 1, row 2 for a comparably misspeciﬁed equation.
Cumulating real disposable personal income growth rates over the term by
imposing the weighting parameters estimate of 0.8 obtained in Hibbs (1982)
has been adopted in subsequent research, evidently without re-estimation of
the lag structure (see, for example, Erikson, 1989; Erikson and Wlezien,
1996). Keech (1995: 137) describes application of economic lag sequences
based on a geometric weighting parameter of 0.8 as “the standard that has
become widely accepted”. If this be so, the regressions in Table 1 indicate
that such a standard is misguided, at least insofar as U.S. presidential voting
is concerned.
It seems clear from Figure 1 that the benchmark estimates for the Bread
and Peace model are stable in all time-regions of the postwar sample. Re-
gressions 3, 4 and 5 in Table 1 conﬁrm this for samples omitting the 1952
and 1968 “war” elections, and for samples conﬁned to the ﬁrst 8 and the last
7 presidential elections. The parameter equivalence statistics show that it is
impossible to reject at any sensible test level the null hypotheses of equality
between coefﬁcients obtained in the full sample benchmark regression and
estimated coefﬁcients in these (as well as other) timewise variations of the
observation regime.
2. Theoretical rationalization of the model
2.1. Stochastic properties of real disposable personal income per capita
What one makes theoretically of the strong connection between aggregate
real income growth and voting outcomes featured in the Bread and Peace
model depends partly on the stochastic properties of the disposable incomes
and on how income realizations affect valuation of the parties and electoral
choice. We know that variables like log output, log real labor income, and log
real consumption are very well approximated by random walks with drift.
Below I conﬁrm this to be true also of log real disposable personal income
per capita. (See also Mankiw and Shapiro, 1985.) Standard test equations are
ln Rt D  C t C  ln Rt−1 C rt (2)155
Table 2. Stochastic properties of log real disposable personal income per capita
(1949:1–1996:4).
Model: ln Rt D  C trend C ln Rt−1 C rt
  R
2 Box-Pierce Q
signif. level
1. 54.5 0.023 0.985 .999 .51
(1.0/.33) (0.67/.50) (60.1/.00)
Ft e s to f D 0;D 1 equals 1.46 with signiﬁcance level .90
2. 17.4 0.996 .999 .25
(1.7/.08) (368/.00)
Ft e s t D 1 equals 2.5 with signiﬁcance level .12
Model: ln Rt D ln Rt−1 C  C rt;1 ln Rt D  C rt
3. 1.90 .49
(6.1/.00)
Notes. In parentheses (t-ratio/signiﬁcance level); 1959:1, the ﬁrst period of the revised chain-
linked NIPA data, is omitted.
ln Rt D  C  ln Rt−1 C rt (3)
Table 2 reports regressions for 400 times the log of real disposable per-
sonal income per capita (ln R). Results for Equation (2) in row 1 of the table
show that the joint hypothesis  D 0;D 1 cannot be rejected by the Dickey-
Fuller test based on the OLS F statistic. Estimates for Equation (3) in row 2
indicate that the single-parameter null of  D 1 also cannot be rejected at
usual test levels, supplying additional evidence that ln R obeys a random walk
with drift, perturbed by random shocks which are serially uncorrelated glob-
ally according to the Box-Pierce Q test and other residual diagnostics.12 The
implication is that quarter-to-quarter changes in log real disposable personal
income per capita .1ln R/ are unforecastable, apart from an annualized drift
rate () of about 1.9% per quarter (Table 2, row 3). It follows that realizations
of 1ln R deviated from  may to a good ﬁrst approximation be interpreted
as “news” in real disposable income growth rates (rt) that are permanently
embodied in future real income stocks ln R.
Table 3 supplies additional evidence that log real disposable income per
capita growth rates are unforecastable. Regressions 1 and 2 show that runs
of good and bad news have no systematic relationship to the party of the
President. If this was not the case, an electorate motivated by real income
performance would be endowed ex-ante with valuable information about the156
Table 3. Presidential terms and per capita real disposable personal income growth rate “news”
(1949:1–1996:4).
Models: .1ln Rt − /  rt; rt D C C Political periodst−1
Terms Terms following
C Democratic Republican following President re-
terms terms party re- elections
elections
1. –0.165 0.397
(–0.40/.68) (0.63/.53)
2. 0.231 –0.165 F test of [Dem(.23)-Rep(–.17)]
(0.48/.63) (–0.40/.67) =0 is 0.4 with signif. level .53
3. 0.387 –0.930
(0.95/.34) (–1.5/.14)
4. 0.045 –0.268
(0.13/.90) (–0.32/.75)
Notes. In parentheses (t-ratio/signiﬁcance level); 1959:1, the ﬁrst period of the revised chain-
linked NIPA data, is omitted.
economic competence of presidential election contestants. It follows that
elections would likely be less competitive intertemporally then they appear
to have been from the historical record, with outcomes being biased in favor
of the more competent party’s candidates. The results in regressions 3 and
4 indicate that performances turned in by incumbent parties or incumbent
Presidents also yield nouseful information about likely growth rate deviations
from drift during terms just following their re-election. Parties or Presidents
with successful enough real income growth rate records to secure re-election
have not delivered second term records (or, in the case of parties, third term
records) departing signiﬁcantly from the ex-ante expected value of news
equal to zero.13
2.2. The rationality of pure retrospective voting
In view of the stochastic properties of log real disposable personal income
per capita established in Tables 2 and 3, a natural interpretation of the Bread
and Peace model is that voters reward or punish the incumbent party for per-
manent changes to their economic wellbeing, calibrated ex-post at election
periods in terms of comparatively good or bad runs of real income growth
rate news that are only modestly discounted (and perhaps not discounted at157
all) over the administrative term.14;15 In the wake of the rational expectations
revolution in economic theory (and beyond) with its strong and sometimes
compelling emphasis on forward looking behavior, many have come to
interpret such pure retrospective voting as “naïve”. This interpretation is
misguided.
As Ferejohn (1986) and Pelzman (1990) have argued, the electorate can
be seen as standing in principal-agent relation to the incumbent party. Voters
settle up with their agent, here the party of the President, by retrospective or
ex-post evaluation of performance for much the same reason – moral hazard
– that insurance premia are typically experience-rated or that compensation
of top corporate executives is heavily dependent on past proﬁtability of the
ﬁrm. Under pure retrospective electoral valuation, promises to do better in the
future are discounted completely and exert no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on voting
choice. Instead, retrospective theory emphasizes the efﬁciency of inducing
governing parties (and their ofﬁcials in ofﬁce) always to do their best in
certain knowledge that voting settlements will be calibrated from observed
outcomes over the term, no matter how attractive (inherently unenforceable)
commitments about future improvements toperformance mayappear to be.In
the words of the original proponent of retrospective voting assessments, Key
(1966: 61) “Voters may reject what they have known; or they may approve
what they have known. They are not likely to be attracted in great numbers by
promises of the novel or unknown". Under this interpretation of the rational-
ity of pure ex-post retrospective voting, bygones are never bygones (as they
would be under a pure forward looking orientation), but rather form the main
engine of voters’ electoral valuations and parties’ electoral successes.16
This view of retrospective political evaluation contrasts sharply with the
forward view of voting, which is more akin to the fundamentalist theory of
asset prices: Current asset values (the parties’ stock of votes at elections)
are driven by the present discounted value of expected future pay-offs. Pure
retrospective economic voting also rejects so-called “rational retrospective”
theories whichassert thatonly post-election consequences ofwithin-term per-
formance should affect current voting outcomes. (See, for example, Alesina,
Londregan, and Rosenthal, 1993; and Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995, who ﬁnd,
however, no empirical support for this conception of rational retrospective
theory.) If within-term realizations 1ln R are the main economic determinant
of votes for President as maintained by the Bread and Peace model, and if
voters respond only to cumulative news about real income growth rates, then
rational retrospective voting is ruled out immediately because news (by deﬁn-
ition) is unforecastable. If voters respond instead to predictable future real
disposable income growth as opposed just to growth rate news, then forward-
looking voting (which in this case would not be ‘rational’ in the usual forward158
sense) still fails when log per capita real disposable personal income evolves
as a random walk plus drift. The lack of consistency of this forward view with
the evidence is particularly stark when the weights placed upon pre-election
growth rates are anywhere near as high as those implied by the estimates of
the lag weight parameter  in Table 1.17
2.3. Individual electoral choice and aggregate vote shares
In order to motivate aggregation I assume that voters perceive government
policy action and competence as having small effect on cross-sectional in-
come dispersion by comparison to the political signal carried by cyclical
variations of mean incomes. Under this assumption (which I relax in one
of the regression experiments in the next section) voters are rationally “so-
ciotropic” and appraise the incumbent party by focusing on the time path of
mean real personal disposable incomes, Rt. (See Kramer, 1983 and Hibbs,
1993: Sections V–IX.)
Voters also understand the stochastic structure of real income realizations,
ln Rt D  C ln Rt−1 C rt, and reward or punish their incumbent agent at
elections by evaluating innovations rt that represent permanent proportional
changes to the time path of mean real disposable personal incomes:
.1ln Rt − E.1ln Rt// D rt D .1ln Rt − /:18;19
As already noted, the incentive structure of pure retrospective voting im-
plies further that growth rate news is evaluated over the whole term of ofﬁce
with low (or no) backward discounting. I take all parameters to be common
across voters and therefore arrive at an income growth evaluation term of the
form introduced in Equation (1):
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where   1 and J is the over-the-term evaluation period.
Let g.Xt/ designate the systematic factors affecting evaluations of in-
cumbent performance; namely over-the-term realizations of 1Rn e w sa n d
CUM KIA as maintained by the Bread and Peace model. Unobserved voter
propensities to support the candidate of the incumbent party are indexed by
V
it and are determined stochastically by
V

it D g.Xt/ − "it; (5)159
where "it are random events at each election that disadvantage the incum-
bent party and are unknowable ex-ante. It follows that voting choices are
probabilistic:
Vit D

1i fV 
it D g.Xt/ − "it  XS
0i fV 
it D g.Xt/ − "it < XS (6)
Prob.Vit D 1/ D Prob.g.Xt/ − XS/  "it
D Prob."it  .g.Xt/ − XS// (7)
D F.g.Xt/ − XS/
where Vit D 1 is a vote for the incumbent party candidate by voter i at
election data t,20 XS is an exogenous ﬁxed performance standard, and F is
the cumulative distribution function of random events " over voters i at any
election. Notice that under the pure retrospective decision rule the systematic
source of voting choices is the incumbent party’s performance relative to a
given standard, XS. The opposition party’s role is merely to be available as
a replacement in the event that incumbent party performance is inadequate
under the choice mechanism of (6)–(7).
Generally speaking, a plausible assumption is that the "it are drawn from
some bell shaped distribution with F being, say, the cumulative normal or the
cumulative logistic. Over the relevant range of aggregate voting outcomes,
however, these distribution functions are quite ﬂat (incumbent percentage
vote shares vary between 44.6 and 61.8 in the postwar sample period). Hence
assuming a uniform (rectangular) distribution of random events does no im-
portant injustice to the aggregate empirics and it yields functional forms
permitting ready comparison of my regression experiments to the vast liter-
ature on aggregate economic voting in which the regressand is nearly always
a vote share. Accordingly let "it be evenly distributed over voters between
−k C "t and k C "t, where k is a positive constant and "t is the condi-
tional mean of "it at election date t.21 At each election realizations of "it
therefore have probability density ft."/ D 1=2k and cumulative distribution
Ft."/ D ."it − .−k C "t//=2k.
In view of (7), uniformly distributed random events implies the linear vote
probability function
Prob.Vit D 1/ D
k C g.Xt/ − XS − "t
2k
: (8)
Using (4) and aggregating over voters i to ﬁnd 1
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We obtain the Bread and Peace model of (1) after writing the left-side of
(9) as the incumbent party’s percentage vote share,
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3. Robustness of the model
I now investigate the robustness of benchmark estimates for the Bread and
Peace model to a sequence of twenty-two additional variables (or sets of vari-
ables) appearing in the voluminous literature on presidential voting. Results
of these regression experiments are reported in Table 4. The second column
of each row reports parameter estimates, t-ratios and signiﬁcance levels
(“p-values”) for the additional test variable(s). The third column gives the
signiﬁcance level for the null hypothesis of parameter equivalence between
the Bread and Peace model coefﬁcients obtained for each test equation and
the corresponding Bread and Peace estimates for the benchmark regression
in Table 1, row 1.
3.1. Old news
Absent U.S. involvement in undeclared wars, the Bread and Peace model
assumes elections are affected only by permanent innovations to real income
realized during the incumbent party’s most recent term. In this sense retro-
spective evaluation or ex-post ‘settling up’ are horizon-bounded. The ﬁrst
regression experiment in Table 4 tests the proposition that ex-post evaluation161
Table 4. Robustness of the Bread and Peace model to additional variables (1952–1996
presidential elections).
Model: Votet D 0 C 1
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Signif. level for
Test variable equivalence of
Test variable(s) parameter O 0 O 1 O 2O  to
estimates benchmark
(t-ratio/ estimates in
signif.level) Table 1, row 1
1. Incumbent party’s vote share at last election –0.06 1.0
(‘old’ news, unbounded retrospection) (–0.33/1.0)
2. Inﬂation
P
j j1ln CPI−j

—0.18 .99
(–0.54/.62)
3. Inﬂation surprises –0.73 99 hP
j j.1ln CPI−j − E−j−11ln CPI−j/
i
(–0.66/.54)
4. Unemployment rate
P
j jU−j

–0.87 .95
(–0.68/.52)
5. Change in unemployment
P
j j1U−j

0.02 1.0
(0.00/.99)
6. Fair’s economy:
election yr. output growth, g3 0.26
(0.86/.43)
inﬂation over the term, p15 –0.11 .77
(–0.34/.74)
number of high growth quarters, good-n –0.51
(–1.2/0.29)
7. Volatility (SD) of 1ln R over –0.23 .99
the term (15 quarters) (–0.46/.66)
8. Pct. change in volatility (SD) 0.07 .99
of 1ln R from previous administration (0.72/0.50)
9. Gini ratio for family income quintile shares at 22.5 .96
the election year (0.77/.47)
10. Cumulative pct. Change over the term in 0.86 .99
Gini ratio for family income quintile shares (0.82/.44)
11. Cumulative pct. Change in real federal –0.12 .99
expenditures per capita over the term (–0.60/.57)162
Table 4. Continued.
Model: Votet D 0 C 1
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Signif. level for
Test variable equivalence of
Test variable(s) parameter O 0 O 1 O 2O  to
estimates benchmark
(t-ratio/ estimates in
signif.level) Table 1, row 1
12. Cumulative pct. Change in federal –0.04 1.0
expenditures in proportion to GNP (–0.16/.87)
over the term
13. ‘Extremism’ of incumbent party’s candidate –0.76 .99
relative to opponent (–0.72/.49)
14. House vote share of incumbent party at –0.10 1.0
the previous mid-term election (–.31/.77)
15. Policy voting and partisan voting P
j j1ln R−j  Dem

–0.66
(-0.84/.44) P
j j1CPI−j

–2.87 .73
(–0.85/.44) P
j j1ln CPI−j  Dem

2.80
(0.92/.40)
16. Asymmetric response to positive and
negative real income changes 3.35 .76 P
j j1ln R−j; for 1ln R−j < 0

(1.3/.23)
17. Stock prices; percent change in DJIA from 0.045 1.0
January to October of the election year (0.054/.43)
18. Yield spread (10 yr. Tbond rate minus 3 –0.54 .99
mos. Tbill rate), 3rd quarter of the election year (–0.60/.57)
19. Family ﬁnancial situation today compared 0.07 .81
to a year ago (% “better” minus % “worse”) (0.63/.55)163
Table 4. Continued.
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2CUM KIAt C Test Variable.s/
Signif. level for
Test variable equivalence of
Test variable(s) parameter estimates O 0 O 1 O 2O  to
(t-ratio/signif.level) benchmark
estimates in
Table 1, row 1
Business conditions today compared to a 0.03
year ago (% “better” minus % “worse”) (0.93/.39)
20. Expected change in family ﬁnancial 0.05 .96
situation over the next year (% “better” (0.43/.69)
minus % “worse”)
Expected change in business conditions over 0.01 .98
the next year (% “better” minus % “worse”) (0.09/.93)
21. Expected change in business conditions over 0.03 .98
the next 5 years (% “better” minus % “worse”) (0.42/.69)
22. Gallup pct. Presidential approval rating, 3rd 0.11 .74
quarter of election years (1.4/.20)
Notes.Dueto lack of1952 dataon the testvariables, regressions 19–21 areestimated for1956–
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extends further back than the most recent term by including the vote share re-
ceived by the current incumbent party at the previous election. The idea is that
the lagged incumbent vote share incorporates “old news”, summarizing the
present relevance of performance outcomes during earlier terms. As shown
in row 1 of Table 4, performance prior to the most recent term does not spill
over to current votes for President. The coefﬁcient estimate for the incumbent
party’s vote share at the previous election is essentially zero, and estimates
of the Bread and Peace model parameters obtained under this variation of
functional form are nearly identical to those in the benchmark regression.
Rounded from the third decimal place, the p-value for the hypothesis of joint
parameter equivalence is 1.0.164
3.2. Inﬂation and unemployment
Test regressions 2 to 5 estimate the conditional effects of macroeconomic
variables that feature prominently in the presidential voting literature. I ﬁnd
that the inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate and changes in the unem-
ployment rate have no inﬂuence on election outcomes when conditioned
on the Bread and Peace equation.22 I also estimate the impact of inﬂation
surprises, on the argument that unexpected price changes are costly econom-
ically and, hence, politically. Expected inﬂation is calibrated from poll data
on “the expected change in prices over the next twelve months” obtained by
the University of Michigan’s Surveys of Consumers. Inﬂation surprises are
deviations of expected inﬂation in the surveys at each quarter from the cor-
responding observed rate of change of the Consumer Price Index.23 Statistics
for this experiment in test regression 3 imply that unexpected inﬂation has
no effect on voting outcomes.24 And here, as in the other test regressions, the
variation in functional form does not alter the Bread and Peace coefﬁcient
estimates, which with near statistical certainty have the same values as in the
benchmark regression.
3.3. Fair’s economy
One of the best known models of aggregate presidential voting origin-
ates with Fair (1978). Since his ﬁrst paper Fair has generated a sequence
of models, with one revision following the other in the light of success-
ive presidential election outcomes and the model shortcomings (mainly
election prediction failures) revealed thereby.25 The most recent vintage
of Fair’s equation (6 November 1998, obtained from Fair’s web site
http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu) includes three economic variables: g3, the av-
erage growth rate of real per capita GDP in the ﬁrst three quarters of the
election year, p15, the absolute value of the GDP deﬂator annual growth rate
during the ﬁrst 15 quarters of the administration, and n-good, the number of
(“good news”) quarters during the term in which the annual growth rate of
real per capita GDP exceeds 3.2 percent.26
Fair rejects the criticism that his work amounts to an empirically driven
sequence of ad-hoc regression setups (see, for example, Bartels, 1997), main-
taining instead that his equation(s) should be interpreted as implementing the
theory that “a voter evaluates the past economic performance of the compet-
ing parties and votes for the party that provides the highest expected future
utility” (Fair, 1997: 197). Even n-good, the number of high growth rate quar-
ters during an administration, isasserted tobe “completely consistent withthe
general theory”. The problem with this claim is that output growth perform-
ance (g3, n-good) exhibits essentially no persistence from one administration165
to the next.27 In any case, the estimates for regression 6 in Table 4 show that
Fair’s economic terms add no signiﬁcant value to the Bread and Peace model.
3.4. Macroeconomic volatility
Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1999) and Quinn and Woolley (1998) have argued
that stabilization of economic well-being is an important and consequen-
tial demand in democratic political settings. Cameron’s seminal paper and
Rodrik’s more recent research suggest that exposure to macroeconomic in-
stability – which is especially pronounced in small open economies – is the
key determinant of international variations in government spending relative
to GNP. Their work implies (and in Rodrik’s case it is formally based upon)
the assumption that electorates have strong distaste for the insecurity asso-
ciated with macroeconomic instability. Because government spending is less
susceptible to market induced ﬂuctuations than private output (and to some
degree is designed to offset market volatility), other things equal political
democracy is a source of growth of government.28 Quinn and Wolley’s re-
search indicated that macroeconomic volatility had direct negative inﬂuence
on voting support for the incumbent party in American elections and elections
elsewhere.
This line of argument is evaluated by test regressions 7 and 8, which adds
to the Bread and Peace equation the standard deviation of real disposable
income growth rates, computed over the 15 quarters preceding each election.
Thevolatility measure has no signiﬁcant effect on aggregate presidential elec-
tion outcomes, and the Bread and Peace parameters are nearly identical to
their benchmark values. Parallel regressions (not reported in Table 4) spe-
ciﬁed with standard deviations (and variances) of changes in log real per
capita GDP, the unemployment rate, and changes in the unemployment rate
also yielded no evidence that votes for President responded to variations in
macroeconomic instability.
3.5. Income distribution
As mentioned before Stigler (1973) argued that the likely basis of electoral
competition is distribution. The only data we have on U.S. income distribu-
tion covering the entire postwar period are the Census Department’s annual
series on family incomes from the Current Population Surveys.29 I measure
distribution with the Gini Ratio for family income quintiles published by
the Census Department.30 Nearly all of the distributional action in quintile
shares consists of ﬂowsbetween the top quintile and the bottom two quintiles.
The shifts are known to be signiﬁcantly affected by the state of the macroe-
conomy and the scale of income contingent transfers; with high growth, low166
unemployment and high transfer spending yielding more compressed income
distribution.31
These patterns imply that high and rising Gini ratios should generally
disadvantage the party in power, though the higher turnout propensity of
the afﬂuent could dampen this tendency considerably.32 Moreover, expected
discounted lifetime income, for which we have no direct time series measure-
ment, is probably more relevant politically than the static size distributions
tracked by the Census Department’s family income data. Yet big movements
in distribution of quintile shares of current income almost certainly are mim-
icked by parallel movements in dispersion of expected lifetime incomes. (See
Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993.) Despite the imperfections of Gini ratios
based on current family incomes, the distribution hypothesis appears to be
rejected by the evidence. Estimates for test regressions 9 and 10 indicate
that neither election year family income inequality nor the cumulative per-
centage change in inequality over the term have affected presidential voting
outcomes. And the Bread .and Peace benchmark coefﬁcients are undisturbed
by inclusion of distribution variables.33
3.6. Fiscal conservatism?
In vote equations applied to presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial contests
in a pooled time series of cross-sections for state level election results, Sam
Pelzman(1992) found that incumbents’ vote shares wereinvariably depressed
by over the term growth rates of real federal government spending per capita.
Pelzman’s regressions imply that voters draw no distinctions among spending
categories (defense, public goods and transfers are “equally poisonous polit-
ically”), and that it is spending per se voters have distaste for, not the taxes
levied to ﬁnance it. Moreover, according to Pelzman the effects are large:
Each percentage point of growth in real federal spending per capita sustained
for a year lowers the incumbent party’s vote share in presidential elections by
more than 3 percentage points.
Real federal spending has grown steadily over the postwar period – rising
from around 2000 1987 dollars per person in the early 1950s to almost 5000
per person in the mid 1990s. The obvious question raised by Pelzman’s
results iswhysuccessive presidential administrations facing competitive elec-
tions did not reverse ﬁscal course in the light of voters’ alleged hostility to
the growth of government. Pelzman offers some conjectures which, to say
the least, are strained, especially coming from a forceful proponent of the
Chicago ‘efﬁcient political markets’ tradition. Conditioned on the Bread and
Peace model, my results imply there is nothing to conjecture about. Spend-
ing growth has exacted no electoral penalties. Test regressions 11 and 12
demonstrate that neither cumulative over the term changes in real federal167
spending per capita nor cumulative changes in federal spending in propor-
tion to GNP (a measure that better calibrates growth in the relative scale of
government than per capita spending34) had signiﬁcant effect on votes for
President.35 In other regression experiments not reported here, I was unable
to identify any measure of federal spending that inﬂuenced the incumbent
party’s presidential vote, up or down.
3.7. Candidate ‘extremism’
Building on Rosenstone (1983), Zaller (1998) developed anequation inwhich
aggregate presidential election results are driven by average four-year growth
of real disposable income, a “War” dummy variable for 1952 and 1968 and
the extremism of the incumbent party’s candidate relative to his main op-
ponent at each election. Zaller calibrated his relative extremism variable by
coding respondent perceptions obtained by the National Election Study polls
taken just before presidential elections and just after. Zaller generously made
his mostrecent ‘extremism’ measurements available tome. Testregression 13
shows that Zaller’s relative extremism variable (with high values representing
relatively more extreme or less moderate incumbent party candidates) has
no effect on election outcomes when conditioned on the Bread and Peace
model, thecoefﬁcients ofwhichare undisturbed by thisvariation in functional
form.36
3.8. Moderating elections
Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993, 1996) argue that Democratic and
Republican ofﬁcials deviate to the left and right, respectively, from the mainly
unidimensional preference position of the median voter. This unobjectionable
observation creates, they argue, ‘moderating’ signals in voting outcomes from
off-year to on-year elections, and conversely, over time. Insofar as presid-
ential contests are concerned, the theoretical prediction is that the higher
the incumbent party’s vote share in mid-term Congressional elections, the
lower the incumbent party’s expected vote share at the subsequent presid-
ential election. I test this idea in regression experiment 14 by adding to the
Bread and Peace equation the vote share of the president’s party at the previ-
ous Congressional election (the variable used by Alesina et al.). The results
demonstrate that there is no ‘moderating’ effect from the source proposed by
Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal and that Bread and Peace coefﬁcients are
statistically indistinguishable from benchmark values.168
3.9. Policy voting and partisan voting
The Bread and Peace model, like most voting equations, is based on the con-
ventional “incumbency” voting assumption: The party in power is rewarded
for good and punished for bad performance. Regression 15 simultaneously
tests two contrasting hypotheses concerning partisan-based asymmetries in
the response of voting outcomes to macroeconomic performance. Extending
the political foundation of the so-called partisan theory of macroeconomic
policy (Hibbs, 1977), the ‘policy voting’ hypothesis developed by Kiewet
(1981, 1983) holds that parties beneﬁt from bad realizations of macroeco-
nomic variables to which they are generally viewed as attaching highest
priority (see also Meltzer and Vellrath, 1975). Hence under policy voting,
no matter which party holds the Presidency the Democrats beneﬁt when
the economy is performing poorly on the growth and unemployment fronts,
whereas Republicans beneﬁt from high and rising inﬂation. Partisan voting
theory asserts that the parties are evaluated most heavily in terms of realiz-
ations of their high priority macroeconomic objectives. Income growth and
unemployment have bigger effects on voting outcomes when the Democrats
hold the presidency; inﬂation has greater effect when the Republicans are
incumbent. (See, for example, Fox, 1997 and Powell and Whitten, 1993).
Let Dembe a binary variable equal to +1 when the President is a Democrat
andzero otherwise. Conditioned onthe benchmark Breadand Peaceequation,
policy voting theory would predict negative coefﬁcients for the ﬁrst and third
test variables in regression 15. Partisan voting implies that the coefﬁcient
of the ﬁrst test variable should be positive and the coefﬁcient of the third
should be negative. As in test regression 2, however, the results for this ex-
periment show that inﬂation had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on aggregate votes
for President, even allowing for partisan asymmetry. Likewise, I obtained a
null result for the real income growth asymmetry term. Test regression 15
therefore supplies no evidence favoring either the policy voting or the partisan
voting alternative to the standard incumbency voting assumption.37
3.10. Asymmetric voting responses to good and bad realizations of the
economy
The idea that voting is more responsive to poor performance than good has
a distinguished pedigree. Two eminent examples from political science are
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stoker (1960: 554–555) who claimed “A
party already in power is rewarded much less for good times than it is pun-
ished for bad times” and Key (1966) who observed “people vote only against,
never for”. Subsequently, Bloom and Price (1975) reported regression evid-
ence indicating that aggregate congressional voting outcomes were affected169
more by negative than positive realizations of economic outcomes. More
than a decade later theoretical rationale and laboratory evidence favoring
the asymmetry hypothesis was supplied by ‘prospect theory’, which implies
that individuals usually exhibit greater sensitivity to losses than gains (see
Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Quattrone and Tversky, 1988).
I apply this idea to real disposable income changes in test regression 16
(and to other macroeconomic variables in test regressions not reported) by
computing the absolute value of negative realizations of 1ln R and adding
this variable to the benchmark Bread and Peace model. The point estimate
for the test coefﬁcient is properly signed but the null hypothesis of zero
asymmetry cannot be rejected at any conventional level. And, as before, the
null of parameter equivalence between coefﬁcients in the perturbed Bread and
Peace speciﬁcation and in the benchmark model cannot sensibly be rejected.
3.11. Changes in wealth: Stock prices
Notwithstanding Paul Samuelson’s famous quip that “the stock market has
predicted nine out of the last ﬁve recessions”, stock price exchange are an
important component ofchanges inconsumer wealth38 aswellasacommonly
used indicator of forward expectations about the macroeconomy (see Fama,
1990; and Schwert, 1990). Moreover, the idea that stock price changes are
correlated with presidential election outcomes has circulated in the invest-
ment community for decades. An example is Yale Hirsch’s remark in the
1984 Stock Trader’s Almanac: “As we have learned in the past, the Dow Jones
industrial average has foretold the outcome of presidential elections in this
century. When the venerable average gains ground between New Year’s day
and Election Day, the incumbent party will usually win the election. A loss
in the average during the period will usually result in the ‘ins’ being ousted”.
The claim of investment advisors has begun to appear in statistical equa-
tions co-populated with more conventional economic variables. Gleisner
(1992) and Haynes and Stone (1994) report regressions based on one of Fair’s
(1978) equations (see Section 3.3 above) implying that that each percentage
point increase in the Dow Jones Industrial Average registered between Janu-
ary and October of the election year yields a vote share harvest of between
0.4 to 0.7 percentage points for the incumbent party’s presidential candidate.
Conditioned on the Bread and Peace model in test regression 13, however,
I ﬁnd that votes for President exhibited no response at all to changes in the
DJIA. The same regression experiment using broader market indices, for ex-
ample the S&P 500, yielded results no different than what I obtained for the
Dow Jones industrials.170
3.12. The interested rate spread
In a 1991 paper appearing in the Journal of Finance, Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991) reported the startling discovery that the slope of the yield curve had
signiﬁcant capacity to predict cumulative changes in real output up to four
years in advance, and successive quarter on quarter output changes up to a
year and half in advance. Although the standard errors for output growth
forecasts generated by the yield spread were large relative to the variability of
output changes, the spead dominated conventional leading indicators of the
cycle in out of sample forecasting experiments. Subsequently, Estrella and
Mishkin (1996) showed that the same yield spread variable used by Estrella
and Hardouvelis – the difference between the ten year Tbond interest rate and
the three month Tbill rate – had predictive power for the occurrence of NBER
recessions up to six or seven quarters ahead.
On the standard argument that citizens know how the world works, at
least implicitly, long before econometricians catch on, forward looking voters
could have exploited the modest predictive power of the yield spread to guide
their electoral behavior. Lower spreads (ﬂatter, or even inverted, yield curves)
are noisily associated with slower future output growth and higher future
probabilities of recession.39 The behavioral prediction which follows is that
the higher the spread the higher the vote for the incumbent party’s candidate
at presidential elections. In fact, this line of reasoning has already appeared
in Berry, Elliot, and Harpham (1996) four equation recursive model of votes
for President, presidential job approval ratings, employment growth and in-
ﬂation, which is one reason why I pursue the issue in this paper. The yield
spread is the primes mobile in Berry, Elliot, and Harpham’s setup. It affects
employment growth and inﬂation, which in turn directly, and indirectly via
presidential approval rates, help account for presidential voting.
Test regression 18 shows that conditioned on the Bread and Peace equa-
tion the yield spread had no effect on postwar presidential election outcomes.
Moreover, no other leading indicator I investigated (including the Commerce
Department’s well-known index of leading indicators) exerted any statistical
impact on voting, or perturbed signiﬁcantly the benchmark Bread and Peace
parameter estimates. These results, along with the results for stock price
changes in regression 17, reinforce the evidence favoring the retrospective,
ex post ‘settling up’ foundation of the Bread and Peace model.
3.13. Survey assessments of retrospective and prospective economic
performance
Many studies of presidential voting outcomes and presidential approval rat-
ings have tried to distinguish the relative importance of retrospective and171
prospective valuations of economic conditions by using survey assessments
of personal economic well-being and the state of national business conditions
(see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Tien, 1996; and MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson, 1992 and the sources cited therein.) The results of this research
are somewhat mixed, but an important message is that expectations about
future economic conditions are probably more important than retrospective
appraisals.40 This message contrasts strongly with the cumulative over the
term, retrospective evaluations featured in the Bread and Peace model.
In test regressions 19–21 I investigate whether such survey readings of
voters’ judgments about economic performance (obtained from the Univer-
sity of Michigan Surveys of Consumers) add value to the Bread and Peace
model. Regression 19 shows that short-run retrospective assessments of fam-
ily ﬁnancial well-being and general business conditions exert no signiﬁcant
effects on aggregate votes for President. Test regression 20 yields the same
inference for short-run expected future family ﬁnances and general business
conditions.41 Test regression 21 delivers the same result for longer run ex-
pectations about future general business conditions. Moreover, none of these
variations signiﬁcantly perturbs coefﬁcients of the Bread and Peace equa-
tion, which according to the signiﬁcance statistics in column 3 are with high
probability equivalent to their benchmark values.
3.14. Presidential approval ratings in the Gallup polls
Many presidential voting models, especially those geared to forecasting elec-
tion outcomes, include the President’s Gallup Poll job approval rating among
prediction regressors (see, for example, Abramovitz, 1988; Erikson, 1989;
Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992; Erikson and Wlezien, 1996). Although approval
ratings and other poll readings of voter sentiments about the incumbent Pres-
ident, his party, candidates at elections and so forth are logically inadmissible
in behavioral models of voting, I nonetheless examine the robustness of the
Bread and Peace equation to inclusion of Gallup Poll approval ratings (often
referred to as “presidential popularity”).42
The President’s job approval rating certainly does correlate fairly highly
withtheincumbent party’s vote share atpresidential elections. Projecting vote
shares on third quarter approval ratings, I obtain:
Votet D 31:8 C 0:40 Approvalt−1; R
2
D :70
.4:2/. 0:08/
where standard errors are in parentheses. However, as shown in the last test
regression in Table 4, presidential approval ratings show no sign of having
affected votes for incumbent party candidates, when conditioned on the Bread172
and Peace model. In fact, pre-election approval ratings evidently responded
to per capita real disposable personal income growth rates and cumulative
killed-in-action in much the same way as votes for President. Applying the
Bread and Peace setup to third quarter of election year Approval ratings rather
than Vote shares, yields:
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4. Conclusions
I conclude with just two sentences: A simple Bread and Peace model shows
that aggregate votes for President in postwar elections were determined en-
tirely by weighted-average growth of real disposable personal income per
capita during the incumbent party’s term and the cumulative numbers of
American military personnel killed-in-action as a result of U.S. interven-
tions in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars. No other variable, or set of
variables, I have been able to ﬁnd in the extensive literature on presidential
voting adds value to the Bread and Peace model or signiﬁcantly perturbs its
coefﬁcients.
Notes
1. An Okun’s law type regression (to be interpreted as associational not structural) of annu-
alized, quarter on quarter per capita real personal disposable income growth rates (1ln R,
as deﬁned precisely ahead) on quarter to quarter changes in the rate of unemployment (U)
over 1949:1–1996:4 yields (with t-ratios in parentheses):
1ln Rt D 1:89
.6:4/
− 4:1
.5:9/
.Ut − Ut−1I R
2 D :15; DW D 2:1:
The estimated quarterly Okun multiplier is smaller and the relationship is much noisier
than what is obtained in a more conventional projection of unemployment changes on
quarter to quarter growth of real GDP per capita, reﬂecting the effectiveness of politics
designed to stabilize personal incomes over the business cycle:
1ln GDPt D 2:06
.9:5/
− 7:4
.14:3/
.Ut − Ut−1/I R
2 D :52; DW D 2:1:173
2. I exclude from this statement poll data on voting intentions, candidate preferences and
analogous variables (which I have not investigated) because such variables supply no
behavioral explanations of voting outcomes.
3. The data used for estimation of the equation can be found at my homepage:
http://cent.hgus.gu.se/econdhib/.
4. Given November election dates, election quarter growth rates are computed 1ln Rt D
ln
h 
Rt

Rt−1
1=3i
 400; all others are computed as indicated. This weighting of the
election quarter (which is incorporated to the weight sum normalization), as well as the
exclusion of the ﬁrst quarter (which of course begins prior to inaugurations), have only
minor impact on all results reported.
5. Studies like thisone frequently include the 1948 election.I omititnot so much because the
quarterly National Income and Product Accounts begin in 1947 (and the Bread and Peace
model requires quarterly disposable income data over the whole administrative term) but
mainly because the transition from a total war economy after the defeat of Japan renders
the meaning of the measured economy during demobilization wholly incomparable to the
rest of the postwar period.
6. This bias is not enhanced, however, when an incumbent candidate is running. I established
this in an experiment not reported in which an incumbent candidate binary variable was
added to the Bread and Peace setup.
7. Consequently, such models tend to predict badly presidential voting outcomes when early-
and late-term performance differ substantially as, for example, at the 1976 and 1992
elections.
8. The most comprehensive study of the evolution of public opinion on American in-
volvements in Korea and Vietnam is Mueller (1973). Effects of Korea and Vietnam on
presidential approval ratings are investigated quantitatively by Ostrom and Simon (1985).
Cotton (1986) supplies a more qualitative assessment of electoral consequences of wars.
9. At the 1964 and 1976 elections CUM KIA were only 0.218 and 0.414, respectively, and
so war effects on Vote were negligible. Nixon inherited Vietnam from Johnson, and 1972
effects werefound tobe nil. Hence, very littlewould change if one just used aWar dummy
variable for the 1952 and 1968 elections, which was the approach used in an earlier
version of this paper. The near equivalence of effects at the 1951 and 1968 elections is
consistent with results obtained in related studies. Ostrom and Simon (1985) found that
cumulative killed-in-action had negative effects of almost identical magnitude on Gallup
poll job approval ratings for Truman and Johnson (18 percentage points). Mueller (1973)
found cumulative casualties to have identical effects on poll readings of public support
for American involvement in Korea and Vietnam.
10. Under the Bread and Peace model, the penalty exacted by Vietnam (and Korea) on the in-
cumbent party candidate(s) had little (strictly speaking, nothing) to do with the respective
war policy positions of the major party contestants. As Page and Brody (1972) document
in their 1968 survey-based analysis, there was no appreciable difference between the Vi-
etnam postures of Humphrey and Nixon, either as perceived by voters or as registered by
calibrations of the candidates’ (rationally vague) pronouncements and promises. Hence
there was little or no relationship between voters’ opinions on the war and their electoral
choices. This leads Page and Brody to the erroneous conclusion that the biggest issue
in the 1968 election (and one of the most important non-economic issues in all postwar
American politics) had littleor no inﬂuence on the 1968 presidential election result: “even
if Vietnam policy was extremely important to them [voters], they had to ignore the issue
and vote on other grounds” (Page and Brody, 1972: 984). This misjudgment of the efﬁ-174
ciency of the electoral system reveals, among other things, the poverty of single-election
survey studies as a tool for identifying the sources of electoral change.
11. This paper was intended mainly to supply evidence for the idea that Ronald Reagan’s
substantial victory in 1980 had less to do with a big “shift to the right” in the electorate’s
basic preferences (a common interpretation at the time) than with poor macroeconomic
performance during the Carter Administration. Hibbs (1987: Ch. 6) pursues the issue
further.
12. Other tests deliver the same conclusion; for example, the test equation (standard errors in
parentheses):
1ln Rt D 62:3
.56:8/
C 0:06ln Rt−1
.0:07/
C 0:028
.0:03/
trend R
2 D :004;
Box − Pierce Q signif: level D :61
13. It is worth noting that the test for re-elected Presidents in regression 4 is based only on the
contrast of second-term outcomes under Eisenhower and Reagan with all other periods.
14. Under the pure retrospective voting of the Bread and Peace model, whether voters respond
to the over-the-term history of “news” or to the history of growth rate performance per se,
is of no practical importance. The two interpretations are observationally equivalent given
the stochastic properties of 1ln R. Estimates for Equation (1) differ from the same Bread
and Peace equation using growth rate news Trt  .1ln Rt − /U in place of actual growth
rates as the income regressor only in the scale of the constant, 0. In the later case the
estimated constant would equal O 0 C O 1O   O 0 C7:8  54% of the two-party vote. Note
that at expected value of news equal to 0, this implies a bias favoring the incumbent party
(“the devil you know”). Hence the implication of the Bread and Peace estimates pointed
out in Section 1: The incumbent party need only deliver a weighted-average real income
growth rate of around 1.0% – which is less than the drift rate () of 1.9% – to cross the
vote share break-even point of 50%.
15. The idea that rational retrospective voting implies low (or no) discounting of performance
over the incumbent’s term of ofﬁce was to my knowledge ﬁrst advanced by Stigler (1973)
in his critique of Kramer’s (1971) path breaking analysis of macroeconomic inﬂuences on
voting outcomes. Stigler argued that to the extent prosperity affects election outcomes, the
electorate’s evaluation horizon should span the entire term of ofﬁce (and maybe several
terms of ofﬁce), not just the election year as Kramer had postulated on the argument
that the best guide to the future is the most recent past. As far as I can tell Stigler is
also the ﬁrst to argue that voters should logically respond to deviations of “permanent”
income from the normal (“average” or “trend”) rate of change, an insight which corres-
ponds precisely to the “news” interpretation of real disposable income changes in the
Bread and Peace model. (Although a rougher formulation of this idea, like so many other
others in economics and politics, can be found in Downs, 1957.) Stigler, however, found
that macroeconomic outcomes exerted little or no effects in Kramer’s setups when the
economy was computed over the entire Congressional term, and not just the election year.
He reasoned that prosperity was not a contentious issue and conjectured that the basis for
partisan competition was largely distributional. I test for income distribution effects on
presidential voting in the next section.
16. Fiorina (1981) supplies a monograph-length analysis of the history, mechanics and survey
based evidence on retrospective voting in the United States.
17. At election dates t D T, the rational expectation of post-election real income stocks and
growth rates would be ET.ln RTC/ D ln RT C ,E T.1ln RTC/ D ; D 1;2;:::
Events prior to elections therefore might be informative ex-ante only about potential shifts175
inthedrift rateaffectingpost-election growth. But weseenoevidence of predictableshifts
in  from Tables 2 and 3, as already pointed out in the main text.
18. Note that by Jensen’s inequality ln Rt  ln.EtRit/  Et.ln Rit/, where subscript i denotes
voters. It follows that 1ln Rt D 1Et.ln Rit C t), where t is f1ln Rt − 1Et.ln Rit/g
which increases with positive changes in income dispersion. (For example, if incomes are
log normally distributed, ln Rt D Et.ln Rit/ C 1=22
t .ln Rt/.) 1ln Rt therefore exceeds
1TEt.ln Rit/U when inequality of distribution increases, and conversely.
19. A ﬁrm believer in the permanent income hypothesis might use changes in consumption to
calibrate news in changes to permanent disposable incomes (see, for example, Pelzman,
1990).
20. As before, minor party choices (on several occasions non-trivial in the postwar period)
are normalized away by speciﬁcation of V in terms of major party choices.
21. Hence random events may (and, in fact, are likely to) favor incumbent or opposition
parties at any given election; in general the conditional mean Et."it/  "t 6D 0. However
over all elections the unconditional mean is assumed to obey E."t/ D E."it/ D 0w h i c h
motivates the usual least squares disturbance assumption. Group speciﬁc biases could
easily he accommodated by permitting group variations in "t or XS, but there would be
no gain to modeling aggregate election results.
22. The same conclusion holds for the absolute value of inﬂation (worth testing since voters
may be as hostile to deﬂation as inﬂation).
23. In this equation, and in many other test equations reported ahead, the results pertain
to models imposing a common lag weighting parameter  on 1ln R and the test vari-
able(s). In every relevant case, however, a parallel experiment was undertaken in which
the weighting parameter was permitted to vary. The outcomes of these experiments in no
case differed in any important way from results reported in Table 4.
24. Following Fisher, I also calibrated inﬂation surprises by decomposing the risk free nom-
inal interest rate (the market rate on three month Treasury Bills) into expected inﬂation
and the expected real interest rate. This inﬂation surprise series also had no effect on
voting outcomes when conditioned on the Bread and Peace model.
25. Fair (1996) reviews the history of his various equations.
26. Fair’s equation also includes terms for the duration of party control of the presidency and
for the party of the incumbent. These coded variables have no theoretical rationale and
were evidently developed to ﬁt election outcomes. I disregard them.
27. During the postwar period p15 exhibits some persistence given the run up of inﬂation
rates from the 1960s to 1970s, followed by de-escalation of inﬂation in the 1980s.
28. See Section 3.6 on “ﬁscal conservatism”.
29. These data are less than ideal for calibrating distribution. Among other limitations, the
Census income concept excludes taxes paid but includes transfers received, although
percentage changes in Gini ratios based on a broad concept of income are evidently
insigniﬁcantly different from changes based on the usual Census income concept (see
Weinberg, 1996). Moreover, the concept of “family” clearly has changed considerably
over the postwar years. The Census Department also produces a “household” series (a
more comparable category intertemporally) but these data are available for a shorter
period.
30. Recall the Gini ratio varies between zero and one, taking a value of 0.0 at perfect quintile
equality and a value of 1.0 when all income goes to one quintile.
31. Personal taxation (omitted from Census income), though nominally progressive, is ef-
fectively proportional and makes very little contribution to equalization. See Hibbs and
Dennis (1988) and the sources cited therein.176
32. The electoral effects of socioeconomically contingent voting turnout is a complicated
matter that is well outside the scope of this paper. The most comprehensive analysis is
Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980).
33. Stoker (1986, 1993) shows how adding distribution measurements to macro equations
can be used to check the veracity of aggregation procedures, which I solved by just
maintaining homogeneous response parameters in (1).
34. Federal spending in percent to GNP does not exhibit the pronounced trend of per capita
real spending; it has oscillated in the low 20’s since the late 1960s.
35. Pelzman (1992) used cycle-adjusted and Korean War-adjusted (but not Vietnam War-
adjusted) spending data. I do not because such adjustments are inevitably quite arbitrary
and raise issues about the veracity of results. Since business cycle-adjusted spend-
ing, ceteris paribus, rises in contractions and falls in booms, unadjusted data should,
if anything, bias regression results toward detecting negative reactions to spending
increases.
36. This of course does not mean that in principle “extremism” and “moderation” are not
relevant. But the extremity of candidate positions, and of candidates generically, are
obviously endogenous phenomena affected by the anticipated electoral consequences of
proposing “far out” policy positions or of nominating “far out” candidates. Short of se-
lecting candidates and their policy positions by lottery, I do not see how one could argue
that candidate characteristics of this sort could ever be regarded as exogenous. For these
reasons I think it unlikely that “extremism” as Zaller (1998) thinks of it will ever prove
to be an econometrically defensible determinant of election results. This seems to me to
be doubly true given the practice of calibrating extremism and related voter assessments
from data obtained partly from surveys taken just after election dates and, hence, in the
common knowledge of the election winners and extensive media commentary thereon.
37. A regressions test identical to 15 except that unemployment appeared in place of real
income growth also revealed no signs of policy or partisan voting.
38. In Hall’s famous paper (1978) on the life-cycle, permanent income hypothesis about con-
sumption, for example, stock prices were the only variable to improve upon the prediction
of future consumption from consumption the previous period.
39. The transition mechanisms are not well understood. A standard scenario is that high short
rates relative to long follows a tightening of monetary policy, which is perhaps undertaken
to offset lax ﬁscal policy and allied fears about higher inﬂation expectations. Real activity
then slows with Milton Friedman’s famous “long and variable lags”. But Estrella and
Hardouvelis (1991) present evidence indicating current monetary policy is not the source
of the yield spread’s forecasting power. However this may be, the yield spread surely
cannot be viewed as exogenous with respect to expectations about (and, hence, realiza-
tions of) future real activity and the associated demands and supplies of loanable funds.
Nonetheless, forward oriented voters could have used the spread as a noisy forecasting
device.
40. See, however, Clarke and Stewart (1994) who question the robustness of MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson (1992) results for presidential approval to respeciﬁcations inspired
by modern time series econometrics.
41. Parallel regressions in which the test variables in 19 and 20 were included one at a time
yielded results comparable to those reported.
42. The Approval variable is based on computations of the number of Gallup Poll respondents
answering “approve” in percent of those answering “approve” plus “disapprove” to the
question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [name of incumbent] is handling his177
job as President?” Quarterly values are averages of the approval ratings computed from
each poll taken in a quarter.
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Appendix 1. Calibration of the election effects of American military
participation in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars
To calibrate the vote losses associated with Americanparticipationin the Koreanand
Vietnamese civil wars, I investigated terms of the form 2
14 P
jD0
jXt−j  NQt,w h e r e
X denotes test variables that included the number of American military personnel
killed-in-action per quarter, the number of Americans wounded per quarter and the
total number of American casualties per quarter, and NQ is a binary nulliﬁcation
term equal to 0.0 for Q quarters following the election of a new President and 1.0
otherwise. NQ deﬁnes the “grace period” for “inherited” wars, that is, the number
of quarters of a new President’s administration during which Americans killed-in-
action, Americans wounded or total American casualties exerted no effect on the
subsequent presidential election outcome. NQ therefore determines how the vote for
Dwight Eisenhower in 1956 (who inherited U.S. engagementin the Korean civil war
from Harry Truman) was affected by (the small number of) Korean War casualties
suffered by American military personnel after he assumed ofﬁce in 1953 and, espe-
cially, how the vote for Richard Nixon in 1972 (who inherited U.S. involvement in
the Vietnamese civil war from Lyndon Johnson) was affected by the declining but
still signiﬁcant numbers of casualties suffered by American troops after he assumed
ofﬁce in 1969. NQ could not be estimated directly by standard techniques (it is not
identiﬁed); it had to be pinned down by manual search over relevant values, NQ D 0
for 1;2;3;:::;16 quarters.
Nonlinear least squares estimation of Bread and Peace test equations for each X
variate over relevant values of NQ (with separate lag weighting parameters for real
incomegrowthandthe Americancasualtyterm)establishedthat D 1:0;X =killed-
in-action and NQ D 0 for 16 quarters was the optimal combination for calibration of
war effects. This yields the cumulative killed-in-action term (CUM KIA) appearing
in Equation (1) of the main text. At optimal value NQ D 16, CUM KIA is nulliﬁed
(takes zero values) at the 1956 and 1972 elections.